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1 Introduction
During the last decade, credit derivatives have become important instruments to lay off
or take on credit risk. The credit derivatives market has grown exponentially. Until
today only very limited empirical research has been devoted to these new instruments,
although several reduced form models have been developed to price them. Most empirical
papers on credit risk modelling have focussed on defaultable bonds. In this paper, we
estimate reduced form models and compare model-implied credit default swap premiums
to market data. We show that a reduced form model gives more accurate estimates
of default swap premiums than bonds’ yield spreads. Moreover, we shed light on the
choice of the default-free term structure of interest rates. We find that swap and repo
curves significantly outperform the government curve as proxy for default-free interest
rates for investment grade issuers, but that their performance is similar for speculative
grade issuers. As such, this is one of the first studies to empirically confirm that financial
markets no longer see Treasury bonds as the default-free benchmark.
A default swap protects its buyer from losses caused by the occurrence of a default
event to a debt issuer. In exchange for this default protection, the buyer pays a periodic
premium to the protection seller. The no-arbitrage value of the default swap premium
can be derived by applying a reduced form credit risk model. In these models, prices of
default-sensitive instruments are determined by the risk-neutral default probability and
the recovered amount at default. Default is often represented by a random stopping time
with a stochastic or deterministic hazard rate, while the recovery rate is often assumed
to be constant. We have a large data set of market quotes on credit default swaps at
our disposal. This allows us to conduct empirical testing of reduced form models, which
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the literature has lacked so far. To the best of our knowledge, the only other study that
analyses credit default swap data is Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002). Their primary analyses
are regressions of default swap premiums on proxies for credit risk, whereas we estimate
and apply a reduced form credit risk model. Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) also implement
the Das and Sundaram (2000) tree model, but on just 75 observations. Moreover, they
used spread curves per rating-sector combination, while we apply our models per issuer.
As a first indication, the default swap premium is often estimated by the yield spread
of a bond with a similar maturity issued by the same borrower. We show analytically that
this relationship only holds approximately. Moreover, we show empirically that the ap-
proximation results in fairly large deviations between calculated and market default swap
premiums. By deriving the risk-neutral pricing formula for a defaultable coupon-bearing
bond, we can explicitly express its dependence on risk-neutral processes for default-free
interest rates, hazard rates and and the recovery rate. Since we focus on the estima-
tion and application of credit risk models, we use a priori estimated default-free term
structures. The choice for default-free interest rates has received little attention in the
literature. Virtually all empirical papers on credit risk modelling used zero-coupon rates
extracted from government bonds. However, since 1998, financial markets have moved
away from estimating default-free interest rates from government securities, and started
using swap and repo contracts instead. We find that using the government curve results
in statistically significant overestimation of credit risk for investment grade issuers, that
using swap curves result in a small but significant bias, and that using repo curves yields
unbiased estimates. For speculative grade issuers, the choice for the default-free curve is
less important, as the performance differences between the three curves are smaller.
We also pay attention to the choice of the recovery rate. Since it is not possible
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to extract both the hazard rate and the recovery rate from prices of bonds of a single
seniority class, we fix the recovery rate to identify the model. We show that not only
bond spreads, but also default swap premiums are relatively insensitive to changes in the
recovery rate as long as the hazard function is scaled accordingly. Therefore, there is no
need to determine the recovery rate very accurately, as long as it takes a reasonable value.
We model the hazard function as a constant, linear or quadratic function of time to
maturity. The parameters of the hazard function are estimated using non-linear least
squares from market prices of bonds of a single issuer. The estimated credit model is
subsequently applied to the pricing of credit default swaps written on the same issuer.
We observe that both the in-sample fit to bonds and the ‘out-of-sample’ fit to default
swaps declines with an issuer’s credit quality. We also find that using the various hazard
rate functions yield more accurate estimates of default swap premiums than directly using
the yield spread of a similar bond. An analysis of the deviations between calculated and
market premiums reveals that the deviations for all models are related to the maturity of
the default swap and the rating of the underlying issuer.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the charac-
teristics of credit default swaps. The literature on reduced form credit risk modelling is
reviewed in Section 3. In Section 4, we derive reduced form valuation models for bonds
and default swaps, and present our estimation framework. The construction of our data
set is outlined in Section 5. In Section 6 we present the results of applying the direct com-
parison methods and the reduced form models. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
3
2 Default Swaps
Default swaps are the most popular type of credit derivatives: according to the latest
Credit Derivatives Survey by the British Bankers’ Association (BBA, 2002) they account
for 45% of the global credit derivatives market and according to the most recent Credit
Derivatives Survey by Risk Magazine (Patel, 2003) for even 73%. A default swap is a
contract that protects the holder of an underlying obligation from the losses caused by
the occurrence of a credit event to the obligation’s issuer, referred to as the reference
entity. Credit events that trigger a default swap can include one or more of the follow-
ing: bankruptcy, failure to make a principal or interest payment, obligation acceleration,
obligation default, repudiation/moratorium (for sovereign borrowers) and restructuring;
these events are jointly referred to as default. A default swap only pays out if the ref-
erence entity defaults; reductions in value unaccompanied by default do not compensate
the buyer in any way. Also, the default event must be verifiable by publicly available
information or an independent auditor. The protection buyer either pays an up-front
amount or makes periodic payments to the protection seller, typically a percentage of the
notional amount. In the latter case, the percentage that gives the contract zero value at
initiation is called the spread, premium or fixed rate. If default occurs, the default swap
can be settled in one of two ways. With a cash settlement, the buyer keeps the underlying
asset(s), but is compensated by the seller for the loss incurred by the credit event. In a
physical settlement procedure, the buyer delivers the reference obligation(s) to the seller,
and in return, he receives the full notional amount. Either way, the value of the buyer’s
portfolio is restored to the initial notional amount.
Several features of default swaps are worth mentioning. If the contract specifies pe-
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riodic payments, and default occurs, the buyer is typically required to pay the part of
the premium payment that has accrued since the last payment date; this is called the
accrual payment. The credit event may apply to a single reference obligation, but more
commonly the event refers to any one of a much broader class of debt securities, includ-
ing bonds and loans. Similarly, the delivery of obligations in case of physical settlement
can be restricted to a specific instrument, though usually the buyer may choose from a
list of qualifying obligations, irrespective of currency and maturity as long as they rank
pari passu with (have the same seniority as) the reference obligation. This latter feature
is commonly referred to as the delivery option. Theoretically, all deliverable obligations
should have the same price at default and the delivery option would be worthless. How-
ever, in some credit events, e.g. a restructuring, not all obligations become immediately
due and payable, so that after such an event bonds with different characteristics will trade
at different prices. This is favorable to the buyer, since he can deliver the cheapest bonds
to the seller. Counterparties can limit the value of the delivery option by restricting the
range of deliverable obligations, e.g. to non-contingent, interest-paying bonds.
Counterparty risk is generally not taken into account in determining deal prices; if a
party is unwilling to take on credit risk to its counterparty, it either decides to cancel the
trade or to alleviate the exposure, e.g. by demanding that a collateral is provided or that
the premium is paid up-front instead of periodically (Culp and Neves (1998) and O’Kane
and McAdie (2001)).
An important application of default swaps is shorting credit risk. The lack of a market
for repurchase agreements (repos) for most corporates makes shorting bonds unfeasible.
So, credit derivatives are the only viable way to short corporate credit risk. Even if a
bond can be shorted on repo, investors can only do so for relative short periods of time
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(one day to one year), exposing them to changes in the repo rate. On the other hand,
default swaps allow investors to go short credit risk at a known cost for long time spans:
default swaps with maturities of up to 10 years can be easily contracted, but liquidity
rapidly decreases for even longer terms.
3 Literature
In the literature, there are two approaches to price bonds and credit derivatives. In
the class of structural models, due to Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), a
firm defaults when the value of the firm’s assets drops below a certain threshold. The
parameters of such models are hard to estimate, because the assets’ market value and
volatility are difficult to observe. In reduced form models, developed by Litterman and
Iben (1991), Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) and Jarrow et al. (1997), the direct reference
to the firm’s asset value process is abandoned. Instead, credit risk is determined by the
occurrence of default and the recovered amount at default. Default is often represented
by a random stopping time with a stochastic or deterministic arrival intensity (hazard
rate), while the recovery rate is usually assumed to be constant. In a somewhat different
approach, due to Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Das
and Sundaram (2000), there is no need to separately model the hazard and recovery
components of credit risk, but it suffices to model the spread process. In this paper, we
use a reduced form model in the spirit of Jarrow and Turnbull (1995).
The empirical literature on reduced form models has focused on estimating the param-
eters of one of three processes: the hazard process, the spread process or the risky short
rate process. The first approach seems to be most popular. Cumby and Evans (1997)
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considered both cross-sectional estimation of a constant hazard rate model and time-series
estimation of several stochastic specifications. Madan and Unal (1998) estimated recovery
and hazard processes in a two-step procedure using Maximum Likelihood (ML) and Gen-
eralized Methods of Methods (GMM). Duffee (1998), Keswani (2000) and Driessen (2001)
applied ML with Kalman filtering to obtain parameter estimates of Cox-Ingersoll-Ross
(CIR) processes from time-series data. Bakshi, Madan and Zhang (2001), Fru¨hwirth and
So¨gner (2001) and Janosi et al. (2002) used non-linear least squares to estimate the model
parameters from cross-sectional data. Janosi et al. specified a stochastic hazard rate that
depends on the default-free short rate and an equity market index; Bakshi et al. estimated
a model with correlated interest rates, hazard rates and recovery rates; Fru¨hwirth and
So¨gner used a constant hazard rate.
The second approach applies the Duffie and Singleton (1999) framework by directly
estimating the spread process. Nielsen and Ronn (1998) estimated a log-normal spread
model using non-linear least squares from cross-sectional data. Taure´n (1999) utilized
GMM to estimate the spread dynamics as a Chan et al. (1992) process. Du¨lmann and
Windfuhr (2000) and Geyer et al. (2001) implemented a ML procedure with Kalman
filtering to obtain parameter estimates of Vasicek and/or CIR models for the instantaneous
spread. Duffie et al. (2003) used an approximate Maximum Likelihood method to estimate
a multi-factor model with Vasicek and CIR processes.
The third approach is to consider the sum of the default-free rate and the spread
and estimate a model for the total risky rate. Duffie and Singleton (1997) utilized this
approach to estimate the swap rate as a 2-factor CIR process using Maximum Likelihood.
All discussed papers assessed the quality of the models on their ability to fit spreads
or bond prices. Since credit derivatives allow credit risk to be traded separately from
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other sources of risk, they provide a clean way of putting a price on credit risk. So, we
may obtain better insights in the performance of credit risk models by applying them to
the pricing of credit derivatives.
4 Methodology
In this section, we first discuss the valuation of bonds and credit default swaps in our
reduced form credit risk model. Then, we elaborate on the specification and estimation
of the model.
4.1 Valuing Bonds
Following Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), we assume a perfect and arbitrage-free capital
market, in which default-free and defaultable zero-coupon bonds, a default-free money-
market account and defaultable coupon bonds are traded. Uncertainty is represented by
a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,Q), where Ω denotes the state space, F is a σ-algebra
of measurable events in Ω and Q is the actual probability measure. The information
structure is represented by the filtration F(t). We take as given some non-negative,
bounded and predictable default-free short-rate process r(t), which drives the default-free
money-market account B(t). Let Q˜ denote the equivalent martingale measure that is
associated with the numeraire B(t); see Harrison and Pliska (1981). That is, Q˜ is the
risk-neutral measure. Let p(t, T ) and v(t, T ) denote the time-t values of a default-free and
a defaultable zero-coupon bond with maturity T and face value 1. Default occurs at a
random time τ , independent of r(t) under Q˜.1 Let P˜(t, T ) denote the risk-neutral survival
1In our empirical application, we use readily available default-free term structures instead of specifying
a risk-neutral process for r(t) and estimating its parameters. Therefore, we cannot estimate the correlation
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probability, i.e. P˜(t, T ) = E˜t[1{τ>T}] with E˜t [X] = EQ˜ [X|Ft] and 1{A} the indicator
function of event A. We assume the existence of a non-negative, bounded and predictable
process λ(t), which represents the default intensity or hazard rate for τ under Q˜. Then,
P˜(t, T ) = E˜t
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
λ(s)ds
)]
= E˜t [exp(−Λ(t, T ))] , (1)
where Λ(t, T ) denotes the integrated hazard function: Λ(t, T ) =
∫ T
t
λ(s)ds.
Now, consider a defaultable coupon bond with coupon payment dates t = (t1, . . . , tn),
coupon payment c, maturity tn and notional 1. We assume that a constant
2 recovery
fraction δ of the notional (and not of the remaining coupons too, see Jarrow and Turnbull
(2000) and Scho¨nbucher (2000)) is paid at the random default time τ . To calculate the
price v(t, t, c) of this bond, we apply the risk-neutral valuation principle to the coupon,
notional and recovery cash flows (cf. Duffie and Singleton, 1997, Equation (26))
v(t, t, c) =
n∑
i=1
p(t, ti)E˜t
[
c1{τ>ti}
]
+ p(t, tn)E˜t
[
1{τ>tn}
]
+ E˜t
[
p(t, τ)δ1{τ≤tn}
]
=
n∑
i=1
p(t, ti)cP˜(t, ti) + p(t, tn)P˜(t, tn) +
∫ tn
t
p(t, s)δf(s)ds,
(2)
where f(t) denotes the probability density function associated with the intensity process
λ(t). In our empirical application, we replace the integral in Equation (2) by a numerical
approximation:3 we define a monthly grid of maturities s0, . . . , sm, where s0 = t and
between default-free rates and the default time, so there is no use in allowing for a correlation parameter
in our model.
2If we assume a stochastic recovery rate that is risk-neutrally independent from the default-free short-
rate process and the default time, all formulas remain valid, except that δ should be interpreted as the
expected recovery rate under the risk-neutral measure. Moreover, the results of Bakshi et al. (2001)
indicated that a model with a stochastic recovery rate performs equally well as a model with a constant
recovery rate.
3This approximation is necessary, because we do not have an analytical expression for p(t, ·), but use
the market’s default-free term structure instead.
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sm = tn and set
∫ tn
t
p(t, s)δf(s)ds ≈
m∑
i=1
p(t, si)δ
(
P˜(t, si−1)− P˜(t, si)
)
.
4.2 Valuing Default Swaps
A default swap contract consists of a fixed leg and a floating leg. The former contains the
payments by the buyer to the seller; it is called the fixed leg, because its payments are
known at initiation of the contract. The floating leg comprises the potential payment by
the seller to the buyer; at the start date, it is unknown how much the seller has to pay
(if he has to pay at all).
Consider a default swap contract with payment dates T = (T1, . . . , TN), maturity TN ,
premium percentage P and notional 1. Denoting the value of the fixed leg by V¯ (t,T, P )
and the value of the floating leg by V˜ (t), the value of the default swap to the buyer equals
V˜ (t) − V¯ (t,T, P ). At initiation, the premium P is chosen in such a way that the value
of the default swap is equal to zero. Since the value of the fixed leg is homogeneous of
degree one in P , the premium percentage should be chosen as P = V˜ (t)/V¯ (t,T, 1).
We first determine the value of the fixed leg. At each payment date Ti, the buyer has
to pay α(Ti−1, Ti)P to the seller, where α(Ti−1, Ti) is the year fraction between Ti−1 and
Ti (T0 is equal to t). If the reference entity does not default during the life of the contract,
the buyer makes all payments. However, if default occurs at time s ≤ TN , the buyer has
made only I(s) payments, where I(s) = max(i = 0, . . . , N : Ti < s) and the remaining
payments I(s) + 1, . . . , N are no longer relevant; in addition, he has to make an accrual
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payment of α(TI(s), s)P at time s.
4 The value of the fixed leg at time t is thus equal to
V¯ (t,T, P ) =
N∑
i=1
p(t, Ti)E˜t
[
α(Ti−1, Ti)P1{τ>Ti}
]
+ E˜t
[
p(t, τ)α(TI(τ), τ)P1{τ≤TN}
]
=
N∑
i=1
p(t, Ti)α(Ti−1, Ti)P P˜(t, Ti) +
∫ TN
t
p(t, s)α(TI(s), s)Pf(s)ds.
(3)
Next, we calculate the value of the floating leg. If the contract specifies cash settlement,
the buyer keeps the reference obligation at default and the seller pays the buyer the
difference between the reference price and the final price. The reference price typically
equals 100%. The final price is the market value of the reference obligation at the default
date;5 under our recovery assumption, the final price is equal to δ, so that the value of
the floating leg under cash settlement equals
V˜ (t) = E˜t
[
p(t, τ)(1− δ)1{τ≤TN}
]
=
∫ TN
t
p(t, s)(1− δ)f(s)ds. (4)
If the contract specifies physical settlement, the buyer delivers deliverable obligations with
a total notional of 1 to the seller and the seller pays 1 in return. Assuming one deliverable,
the value of the floating leg is equal to Equation (4). However, a default swap contract
generally has a delivery option (see Section 2), allowing the buyer to choose from a list
of qualifying obligations. We refrain from valuing the delivery option, and use the value
of the floating leg under cash settlement. To numerically approximate the integrals in
Equations (3) and (4), we use the same method as for the defaultable coupon bond price.
4We assume that if the default time exactly coincides with a payment date Ti, the buyer does not
make the regular payment, but makes an accrual payment, i.e. I(Ti) = i− 1. Since the regular payment
and the accrual payment are equal on a payment date, this assumption does not affect the value of the
default swap.
5Commonly, the calculation agent has to poll one or more dealers for quotes on the reference obliga-
tion, disregard the highest and lowest quotes and calculate the arithmetic mean of the remaining quotes.
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Again, a monthly grid is chosen.
Our default swap pricing formula is very similar to other models encountered in the
literature. The models by Aonuma and Nakagawa (1998), Brooks and Yan (1998), Scott
(1998), Jarrow and Turnbull (1998) and Duffie (1999) are equal to our model, except
that they only allow defaults on premium payment dates. Nakagawa (1999) and Hull
and White (2000), like us, also allowed defaults to occur on other dates than payment
dates. However, Nakagawa (1999) did not incorporate the accrual payment and Hull and
White (2000) assumed that the protection buyer makes a continuous stream of premium
payments, rather than a set of discrete payments.
4.3 Specification
Since we focus on credit risk models, we refrain from estimating a model for the default-free
short-rate. Instead, we use a priori estimated curves to calculate the prices of default-free
zero-coupon bonds. To completely specify the model, we have to (i) select the risk-neutral
hazard model, (ii) pick a recovery rate and (iii) choose a proxy for the default-free term
structure.
4.3.1 Hazard Process
In the literature discussed in Section 3, all studies that use time series estimation model
the hazard rate stochastically, typically as a Vasicek or CIR process. Papers that use
cross-sectional estimation consider either constant or stochastic hazard rates, where the
stochastic process is chosen in such a way that the survival probability curve in Equa-
tion (1) is known analytically. We follow an intermediate approach by using a deter-
ministic function of time to maturity. This specification facilitates parameter estimation,
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while still allowing for time-dependency. We model the integrated hazard function as a
polynomial function of time to maturity
Λ(t, T ) =
d∑
i=1
λi(T − t)i,
where d is the degree of the polynomial and λ1, . . . , λd are unknown parameters.
6 This
specification implies that the hazard rate itself is a polynomial of degree d−1. The survival
probabilities follow directly from Equation (1) as exp(−Λ(t, T )). To the extent that the
survival probability curve from a stochastic hazard specification can be approximated
by our exponential-polynomial function, deterministic and stochastic models will yield
similar results.
4.3.2 Recovery Rate
There are two approaches for the estimation of the recovery rate. The first is to consider it
as just another parameter, and estimate it from the data along with the other parameters.
The second method is to a priori fix a value. Although the first method seems preferable,
it turns out that it is hard to identify the recovery rate from the data. Figure 1a illustrates
this for a constant hazard rate model estimated from a data set of Deutsche Bank bonds
on May 4th, 1999 (the first day in our sample) using the swap curve as proxy for the
default-free curve. We vary the recovery rate from 10% to 90% in steps of 10% and
for each value we estimate the hazard rate. It is clear from the figure that the fitted
zero-coupon curves are virtually identical, except for the one estimated with a recovery
rate of 90%. To get some intuition for this outcome, consider the price of a defaultable
6Note that we have imposed the required restriction Λ(t, t) = 0 by omitting the constant term.
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zero-coupon bond (cf. Jarrow and Turnbull, 1995, Equation (49))
v(t, T ) = p(t, T )[1− (1− δ)(1− P˜(t, T ))].
So, given a default-free curve p(t, T ), the price only depends on the product of 1− δ and
1− P˜(t, T ). Using Equation (1) and a first order Taylor expansion, the bond price can be
approximated as
v(t, T ) ≈ p(t, T )[1− (1− δ)Λ(t, T )].
For the constant hazard rate model, Λ(t, T ) = λ1(T − t), so that the zero-coupon spread
s(t, T ) with respect to the default-free rate is approximately equal to s(t, T ) ≈ (1 −
δ)λ1; see also Duffie and Singleton (1999, below Equation (5)). Decreasing 1 − δ and
simultaneously increasing λ1 by the same ratio will result in approximately the same
spread. Figure 1b shows that this indeed happens when we estimate the hazard rate for
different values of recovery rate. As long as the recovery rate is chosen between roughly
10% and 80%, the product of 1− δ and λ1 is approximately constant.
It is clear that it is hard to identify both the hazard and recovery processes from
bond data; see also Duffee (1998, page 203), Duffie (1999, page 80), Duffie and Singleton
(1999, page 705) and Fru¨hwirth and So¨gner (2003). This may pose a problem for some
applications, but for our purpose of pricing default swaps it fortunately does not. It turns
out that the default swap premium is also relatively insensitive to the assumed recovery
rate. Figure 1c shows the premiums for a 5 year default swap written on Deutsche
Bank for varying recovery rates (and thus varying hazard rates). As long as the recovery
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rate is chosen between roughly 10% and 80%, the estimated default swap premium is
approximately between 13 and 15 basis points (bps). A smaller range of 14 to 15 bps is
obtained, if the recovery is chosen between 10% and 60%. In our implementation, we set
δ = 50%.
4.3.3 Default-Free Interest Rates
Our bond and default swap valuation models require a term structure of default-free inter-
est rates as input data. Since a few years, fixed-income investors have moved away from
using government securities to extract default-free interest rates and started using plain
vanilla interest rate swap rates instead. Golub and Tilman (2000) and Kocic´, Quintos
and Yared (2000) mentioned the diminishing amounts of US and European government
debts, the credit and liquidity crises of 1998, and the introduction of the euro in 1999
as primary catalyzing factors for this development. Nowadays, government securities are
considered to be unsuitable for pricing and hedging other fixed-income securities, because
in addition to interest rate risk they have become sensitive to liquidity risk. Swaps, on the
other hand, being synthetic instruments, are available in unlimited quantities, allowing
investors to go long or short any desired amount. A disadvantage of swap rates is that
they contain a credit risk premium due to two sources. First, being a bilateral agreement
between two parties, an investor is exposed to the potential default of its counterparty.
Duffie and Huang (1996) showed that this premium is quite small however: only one or
two basis points for typical differences in counterparties’ credit qualities. Second, the
swap’s floating leg payments are indexed on a short-term LIBOR rate, which is a default-
risky rate. Therefore, the swap rate will be higher than the default-free rate even though
the swap contract is virtually default-free; see Collin-Dufresne and Solnik (2001).
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An instrument that is less sensitive to the risk of counterparty default and is not linked
to a risky rate is a repurchase agreement (repo for short; see e.g. Duffie, 1996). A repo
is basically a collateralized loan, typically between two banks for a relatively short time
period (1 day to, at most, 1 year). Each instrument has its own repo rate, and the highest
repo rate is referred to as the general collateral (GC) rate.7 GC rates have historically
been close to swap rates, but they were typically several basis points lower. The usage
of repo rates as default-free interest rates was recommended by Duffie (1999, page 75).
Repo rates were also used by Longstaff (2000).
Even though the above seems to be well-known to practitioners, the academic literature
has paid little attention to the choice of the default-free curve. This is demonstrated by the
fact that almost all empirical papers that estimate reduced form credit risk models used
the government curve as the default-free curve; Duffie et al. (2003) are the only exception
by using the swap curve. We estimate our models for all three proxies – government, swap
and repo curves – and see which curve gives the best fit to bond prices and default swap
premiums.
4.4 Estimation
We use cross-sectional estimation to estimate the parameters of our model. Suppose we are
given a default-free zero-coupon curve at time t, and the market prices P1(t), . . . , Pb(t)(t)
of b(t) defaultable bonds issued by a single entity, where the ith bond has payment dates
ti and coupon percentage ci. Then we estimate the parameters of that entity’s integrated
hazard function using least squares optimization with the Gauss-Newton algorithm; see
7Instruments whose repo rates are at or near the GC rate, are called general collateral. Instruments
whose repo rates are significantly below the GC rate are referred to as special. Since data on repo
specialness is hard to obtain, we assume that all considered bonds are general collateral.
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e.g. Greene (2000, Chapter 10). We repeatedly estimate the model until all residuals
are smaller than 2.5 standard deviations, removing the bond with the largest residual (in
absolute sense) each time this condition is not met. This procedure prevents strongly
mispriced bonds from unreasonably affecting the estimated curves; see also Perraudin
and Taylor (1999, Section 2.2). To estimate a curve on a particular trading day, we also
consistently exclude all bonds with a remaining maturity of less than 3 months. In our
data set, such bonds showed constant prices or they were not quoted at all for several
consecutive days. Moreover, we require that on each day, quotes should be available
for at least 5 bonds. This ensures some degree of statistical reliability of the estimated
parameters.
5 Data
The bond data set consists of corporate and sovereign bonds and is obtained from two
sources. From Bloomberg, we obtain bond characteristics, like maturity dates, coupon
percentages and seniorities; a time series of credit ratings for each issuer is also downloaded
from Bloomberg. Clean bid and ask price quotes are retrieved daily at 4.00pm from
Reuters’ Treasury and Eurobond pages. The data covers the period from January 1,
1999 to January 10, 2001 and contains prices of almost 10800 bonds issued by over 1600
different entities. The total number of price quotes is close to 2.5 million. To estimate the
credit risk models, we construct a sample of fixed-coupon, bullet, senior unsecured bonds
that are denominated in euros or in one of the currencies of the participating countries.
This reduces the number of bonds to 3920, the number of unique issuers to 704 and the
number of quotes to approximately 1.1 million.
17
The default swap data set is constructed by combining quotes from two sources. Firstly,
it contains indicative bid and ask quotes from daily sheets posted by commercial and
investment banks, such as J.P. Morgan Chase, Salomon Brothers, Deutsche Bank and
Credit Suisse, and by brokers, such as Prebon, Tradition and ICAP. Secondly, it com-
prises bid and ask quotes from internet trading services creditex and CreditTrade, whose
participants, in addition to banks and brokers, also include other financial institutions
and corporates. The data period ranges from May 1, 1999 to January 10, 2001. In this
period, we observed 48098 quotes on default swaps on 837 distinct reference entities. Con-
tracts denominated in US dollars make up 82% of the quotes, euro-denominated contracts
account for 17% and the remaining 1% is comprised of British pounds, Japanese yens and
Australian dollars. Quotes on dollar contracts are observed in the entire data period,
whereas quotes on euro-denominated default swaps are only observed from March 2000 to
January 2001. All contracts specify quarterly payments by the protection buyer. Virtually
all quotes (99.7%) are for contracts with a notional amount of 10 million (denominated in
one of the above mentioned currencies). The maturity of the default swaps ranges from 1
month to 20 years, with multiples of 6 months up to 10 years being most common; 5-year
deals are most popular, making up 53% of the observations, followed by 3-year (10%),
10-year (7%) and 1-year (4%) contracts. For our subsequent analyses, we constrain our-
selves to default swaps that are euro- or dollar-denominated, have a maturity of at most
10 years and a notional amount of 10 million. Imposing these constraints reduces the
number of observations by 2.7%, but creates a more uniform data set by removing the
least liquid contracts. For our research, we need reference entities for which both bond
and default swap prices are available. Restricting the data sets to this subset of entities,
leaves us with 225 reference entities, 1131 bonds, about 258000 bond prices and about
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23000 default swap prices.
As proxy for default-free interest rates, we consider three alternatives: government
rates, swap rates, and general collateral (GC) repo rates. The zero-coupon ‘euro govern-
ment’ curve is estimated on a daily basis from a data set of liquid German government
bonds.8 We model the discount function as a linear combination of third degree B-splines
basis functions with knots at 2, 5 and 10 years. Euro swap rates are downloaded from
Bloomberg. We apply a standard bootstrapping procedure to extract zero-coupon rates
and interpolate linearly between the available maturities to get a curve for all required
maturities. Finally, we download euro repo benchmark rates from the website of the
British Bankers’ Association (BBA, 2001). Unfortunately, the longest maturity for which
GC rates are available is 1 year, which is too short for our purposes. Therefore, we use
the following method to calculate approximate GC rates for all required maturities: on
each day, we determine the 1-year swap-GC spread and assume that this spread may be
subtracted from the swap rates of all other maturities to get the GC rates. Analogously
to the swap curve, we use bootstrapping and linear interpolation to obtain a zero-coupon
curve.
6 Results
In this section we first discuss the properties of the default swap data set and implement
an approximate default swap pricing method. Then, we present the results of applying
our reduced form credit risk model to our data set. We conclude by analyzing the pricing
errors of the model.
8We assume that Germany is the most creditworthy sovereign issuer in the euro area. Therefore, we
use the German curve as proxy for the ‘euro government’ curve.
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6.1 Analyzing Default Swap Premiums
Since the empirical literature on credit default swaps is restricted to just one other study
(Aunon-Nerin et al., 2002), it is interesting to look at the properties of the data first; see
Table 1. Panel I subdivides the 46820 observations by the reference entity’s credit rating
at the quote date. As may be expected, the rating is a very important determinant of
default swap premiums as average premiums decrease monotonously with credit quality.
In panel II, the sample is further subdivided by deal type. The number of bid quotes is
roughly equal to the number of ask quotes. The average bid-ask spread is 8 bps, but
an increasing pattern with ratings may be observed.9 Note that the bid-ask spreads are
relatively large compared to the quote size. For instance, for AA the average bid-ask
spread of 6.8 bps amounts to 28% of the average quote of 43.4 bps. Contracts in our
database are denominated in one of two currencies : either US dollars or euros. Panel III
shows that dollar-denominated default swaps prevail, but recall that euro-denominated
default swaps are only observed during the second half of the data period. For all ratings,
dollar quotes are on average larger than euro quotes, except for rating B where the number
of euro observations is rather small. This finding still holds, if we also control for quote
date, though to a lesser extent (not shown here). The relation between premium level and
contract maturity is assessed in panel IV. Notice that more than 50% of the observations
resides in the 4- to 5- year maturity range. There does not seem to be a clear relation
between the average default swap premium and maturity. Our findings are in line with
those of Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002), who tested several specifications for the maturity
effect, but none of them appeared to be significant. Finally, panel V shows the behavior
9The bid-ask spread for CCC is negative, but this is most likely caused by the small number of
observations.
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of average premiums over time by grouping the default swaps by quote date into three-
month periods. Except for AA and BB, the quotes for all ratings roughly follow a U-shape
pattern over time: in the middle of the sample period, the average premium is lower than
at the start and at the end.
6.2 Comparing Bond Spreads and Default Swap Premiums
To directly compare bonds and default swaps, we make the following intuitive argument.
Suppose an investor in a coupon-bearing defaultable bond buys protection by entering
into a credit default swap. The package consisting of the bond and the default swap is
free of default risk, so we have “defaultable bond + default swap = default-free bond”.
Hence, the default swap premium should be equal to the spread between the defaultable
and the default-free bond.
To formalize our argument, consider a defaultable bond with coupon payment dates
t = (t1, . . . , tn), coupon c, maturity tn and notional 1. Further, consider a default swap
with the same maturity, premium percentage P and notional 1. For simplicity, assume
that the default swap’s and bond’s payment dates coincide. The value V (t) of the package
to the investor is given by v(t, t, c) −V¯ (t, t, P )+ V˜ (t), whose formulas are given by Equa-
tions (2) to (4). We replace the integrals in the pricing formulas by the approximations
from Section 4; the grids for both the bond and default swap are chosen to be equal to
the payment dates t. Then
V (t) =
n∑
i=1
p(t, ti)(c− Pα(ti−1, ti))P˜(t, ti) +
n∑
i=1
p(t, ti)
(
P˜(t, ti−1)− P˜(t, ti)
)
+ p(t, tn)P˜(t, tn).
The first summation indicates that the bond’s coupon payments c are reduced by the
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‘insurance premium’ Pα(ti−1, ti) on the default swap. The remaining terms shows that
the notional of 1 will be paid eventually, but that the timing depends on the occurrence
of the credit event. The investor is thus protected against default risk, but is now exposed
to the risk of prematurely receiving the notional and thus missing some of the promised
coupons (prepayment risk).
If we further assume that the default-free and defaultable bond are priced at par, then
their yields are equal to their coupon rates (ignoring the prepayment risk). Let y and
Y denote the yield of the defaultable and the default-free bond, respectively, then y = c
and Y = c− P , so that y − Y = P . This confirms that the bond spread should be equal
to the default swap premium. However, we had to make several assumptions to get this
result, so it is only approximately valid. Nevertheless, bond spreads and default swap
premiums should be comparable. This relation was also presented by Aunon-Nerin et al.
(2002), though without proof. Duffie (1999) showed that this relation holds exactly for
par floating rate notes instead of fixed-income coupon bonds.
We will now determine to what extent this relation holds for our data set. For each
quoted default swap written on an entity, we have to find a quoted bond issued by that
same entity with the same maturity. Unfortunately, a bond with exactly the same ma-
turity as the default swap is rarely available. Therefore, we examine two alternative
methods:
1. Find a quoted bond whose maturity differs at most 10% from the default swap’s
maturity;
2. Find two quoted bonds, one whose maturity is smaller than, but at most twice as
small as, the default swap’s maturity, and one whose maturity is larger than, but
at most twice as large as, the default swap’s maturity, and linearly interpolate their
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spreads.
We call method 1 the matching method and method 2 the interpolation method. The
performance of each method is evaluated for all three proxies for the default-free term
structure.
Each time a pair can be formed of a default swap premium and a (matched or inter-
polated) bond spread, we calculate two pricing errors.10 One by subtracting bond bid
spreads from default swap ask quotes, and the other by subtracting bond ask spreads
from default swap bid quotes.11 The pricing errors are summarized in two ways. First, as
the average, denoted by the Mean Pricing Error (MPE), and second as the average of the
absolute values, called the Mean Absolute Pricing Error (MAPE). A negative (positive)
sign of the MPE statistic indicates that the bond market’s estimate of the issuer’s credit
risk is larger (smaller) than the default swap’s market estimate. To test if this under-
or overestimation is significant, we create a time series MPEi1, . . . ,MPEiS, where MPEit
denotes the mean pricing error for method i on date t. We then apply a one-sample
Z-test (see e.g. Arnold, 1990, Chapter 11): Zi =
√
S ·MPEi/si, where MPEi and si are
the sample mean and sample standard deviation of the MPEit series, respectively, and
S is the sample size. Asymptotically, Zi has a standard normal distribution. Similarly,
to determine if significant performance differences exist between our methods, we cre-
ate a time series MAPEi1, . . . ,MAPEiS of mean absolute pricing errors for each method
i. Then, we use a paired Z-test (Arnold, 1990, Chapter 11) to determine if method i’s
performance is significantly different from method j’s, while allowing for non-zero corre-
10The pricing error is often called the default swap basis by market participants; see O’Kane and
McAdie (2001) and Hjort et al. (2002).
11In this way, we are comparing similar sides of the market. For instance, an investor can create an
exposure to an issuer’s default by buying a bond – for which he pays the ask price – or by writing default
swap protection – for which he receives the bid premium.
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lation and unequal variances. The test statistic is defined as Zij =
√
S · d¯ij/sij, where
d¯ij and sij are the sample mean and sample standard deviation, respectively, of dijt =
MAPEit−MAPEjt, t = 1, . . . , S. Asymptotically, Zij has a standard normal distribution.
Figure 2 depicts scatter plots of pricing errors versus default swap premiums per rating
for the interpolation method that uses the swap curve as default-free curve; the plots for
the other methods are similar. If interpolated bond spreads over the swap curve are good
estimates of default swap premiums, all points should lie on the horizontal axis. For ratings
AAA, AA and A, this seems indeed to be the case, so that on average the method does a
good job. This is confirmed by the MPE values in Table 2, which are approximately zero,
though only for AAA insignificant. For rating BBB, the scatter plot and MPE statistic
indicate that bond spreads are on average smaller than default swap premiums; for ratings
BB and B this is almost always the case. Moreover, the Z-test indicates that the MPEs
are significantly different from zero, so that for BBB, BB and B bond spreads are biased
estimates of default swap premiums. For all ratings, the dispersion around the horizontal
axis is fairly large: the MAPE statistics in Table 2, together with the average default
swap premiums in Table 1, imply that the calculated premiums deviate on average 19%
(for BBB) to 68% (for AAA) in absolute value from the market values.
Tables 2 and 3 also shed light on the performance of the other methods. A striking
result is the abominable performance of the government-based methods for AAA to A.
Their MAPE values are up to four times higher than for methods that proxy the default-
free curve with the swap or repo curve. As the paired Z-tests in Table 3 point out, the
underperformance of the government curve for investment grade issuers (so including BBB
too) is highly significant. Moreover, since the MPEs are negative, almost identical in size
to the MAPEs and statistically significant, bond spreads relative to the government curve
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are virtually always larger than default swap premiums for high grade issuers. The MPE
values for the swap and repo curve methods are much closer to – but still significantly
different from – zero. Looking at the MAPE statistics as well, the swap curve methods
perform significantly better than the repo curve methods for investment grade, but signif-
icantly worse for speculative grade entities. For speculative grade issuers, the government
curve methods significantly outperform their swap- and repo-based counterparts. For all
methods the MPE statistics take large, significantly positive values though, indicating
that they all result in bond spreads being smaller than default swap premiums.
6.3 Estimating Hazard Functions
We now turn to the estimation of credit risk models as described in Section 4.4. We
consider three proxies for the default-free curve – government, swap and repo curves –
and three degrees for the integrated hazard function – linear, quadratic and cubic. For
each issuer, we estimate all nine models for each day that we have at least one default
swap quote and at least five bond quotes. Like in Section 6.2, this is done separately
for the bid and ask sides of the market. A model’s quality at day t may be assessed by
looking at the root mean squared error (RMSE) of the deviations between the market
prices and the model prices
RMSE(t) =
√√√√ 1
b(t)
b(t)∑
i=1
ei(t)2
where ei(t) = Pi(t) − v(t, ti, ci). A model’s RMSE is calculated as the average of its
RMSE(t) values over all days in the sample.
The number of observations and the estimation results are shown in Table 4. We
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observe that the goodness of fit deteriorates as the rating declines. We further find that
using more parameters (obviously) yields a better in-sample fit. This holds for all three
proxies for the default-free curve, but especially for the government curve if we move
from a linear to a quadratic model. Table 4 also indicates that using a cubic model has
little advantage over a quadratic model for high grade bonds, but does fit better for low
grade bonds. As to the choice of the default-free curve, we see that for the linear model,
the government curve clearly underperforms the swap and repo curves. For quadratic
and cubic models, on the other hand, choosing a proxy for the default-free curve is less
important. Overall it seems sufficient for AAA and AA to use a linear model with a swap
or repo curve, for A and BBB a quadratic model with a swap or repo curve, and for BB
and B a cubic model with any default-free curve.
Now we turn to the discussion of the estimated coefficients of the integrated hazard
function. For the constant hazard rate model, the average default intensity λ1 increases
with the issuers’ credit rating, except that B’s is somewhat below BB’s. Therefore, on
average, credit ratings do a good job in ranking firms by credit worthiness. However,
the level of the default intensity differs considerably between the models, especially for
investment grade bonds. For instance, if we use the swap curve, we would conclude that
AAA’s default rate is only 7 bps, but if we use the government curve that number would be
about ten times as large. In the quadratic integrated hazard model, the hazard function
is linear, so that λ1 and λ2 are the level and slope coefficient of the hazard function,
respectively. The estimates imply that if we compare the estimated spread curves of two
ratings, the worst rating’s spread curve both starts at a higher level and is steeper. Again,
noticeable differences exist between the three curves. Using the government curve, gives
higher and steeper spread curves than using the swap curve. Comparing swap and repo
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curves, we find that the levels differ by about 10 bps, just like in the linear model, but
that the slopes are exactly equal.12 Finally, we look at the results of the cubic model.
Unlike the nicely ordered level and slope coefficients, there does not seem to be relation
between λ3 and the credit rating. Interestingly, the λ3 parameters of the government
curve models are almost equal to those of the swap and repo curve models.
In conclusion, the choice of a proxy for the default-free curve has a significant impact on
the level and shape of the hazard function. Moreover, the fit of the model to investment
grade bonds is better for the swap or repo curve than for the government curve. For
speculative grade bonds, choosing a proxy is less important.
6.4 Comparing Model and Market Premiums
Having estimated a credit risk model for a specific issuer allows us to calculate model
premiums of credit default swaps written on that issuer.13 Like above, we define two
pricing errors: as default swap ask quotes minus model premiums calculated from hazard
functions estimated from bond bid quotes, and vice versa. Table 5 contains the MPEs
and MAPEs for all nine models subdivided by rating, as well as one-sample Z-tests for
the MPE statistics. Table 6 shows the outcomes of the paired Z-tests for the investment
grade and speculative grade subsamples. If we compare these figures to the ones in
Tables 2 and 3, we see very similar patterns. First, MAPEs increase with credit ratings
for all models, except for high grade entities in the models that use the government curve.
Second, government-based models perform very badly for investment grade issuers: their
12This simply reflects the construction of our repo curve as a parallel shift of the swap curve.
13All premiums are calculated using euro proxies for the default-free term structure. Ideally, we
should use dollar curves for dollar-denominated contracts, but we are unable to obtain dollar repo rates.
However, repeating the analysis in this section for government and swap curves with dollar curves, gives
very similar results (available on request from the authors): dollar-based and euro-based premiums have
a correlation of over 99%.
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MAPE statistics take significantly larger values than for swap- and repo-curve models,
and their significantly positive MPE statistics indicate a large overestimation of default
swap premiums. Third, the MPE values for the swap and repo curve models are close to
zero, and for first degree swap models and second and third degree repo models mostly
statistically insignificant. Fourth, for speculative grade bonds, the government curve
models outperform the swap- and repo-based models; for quadratic and cubic models this
outperformance is significant. Finally, for all models the MPE statistics take significantly
positive values, indicating that they all underestimate the credit risk of low grade entities.
Estimating a hazard rate model gives a clear improvement over the direct methods of
Section 6.2. Comparing the best direct method to the best model for each default-free
curve proxy, we find that MAPE statistics are reduced by 15% to 55% for investment grade
issuers. For speculative grade issuers, hazard rate models outperform the direct methods
by 15% to 20%. Even though using a model works better than directly comparing bond
spreads and default swap premiums, the model premiums of the best-performing model
still deviate on average 20% to 50% in absolute value from the market values. So the
models fit rather well to bonds, but their ‘out-of-sample’ performance on default swaps is
somewhat poor.
We now try to identify the best model. The results show that swap and repo models on
average do a reasonable job for investment grade issuers. The swap-based models some-
what underestimate the true default swap premiums, and except for the linear model,
this bias is significant; the repo-based model, on the other hand, slightly overestimates
the market premiums, but these differences are mostly insignificant (except for the linear
model). Looking at the MAPE statistics as well, the linear and quadratic swap curve
models significantly outperform their repo- and government-based counterparts for in-
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vestment grade entities; the differences between swap and repo models are small though.
For speculative grade issuers, the quadratic and cubic government curve models signifi-
cantly work better than swap and repo models with equal degrees. As to the choice of
the optimal degree of the integrated hazard function, the paired Z-tests indicate that the
quadratic model works significantly better than, or not significantly different from, the
linear and cubic models. This result holds for both investment grade and speculative
grade issuers. All in all, a quadratic model that uses the repo curve seems to be the
best choice for investment grade issuers: it gives unbiased estimates, and has the second
lowest MAPE values. For speculative grade entities, none of the considered models can
be recommended, since they all significantly underestimate credit risk.
The underestimation of default swap premiums for speculative grade issuers is sub-
stantial. If an investor would like to exploit this difference between bond and default
swap markets, he has to write default swap protection (receiving the high default swap
premium) and short a bond (paying the low bond spread). However, as noted earlier in
Section 2, shorting corporate bonds is typically unfeasible, so that positive pricing er-
rors can persist in the market. An explanation for these pricing errors may be found in
missing features in the bond and/or default swap pricing models. O’Kane and McAdie
(2001) and Hjort et al. (2002) discussed a large number of factors that may affect the
difference between default swap and bond markets. They mentioned that for speculative
grade issuers, the delivery option in physically settled default swaps (see Section 2) is
particularly important: for higher default probabilities, it is more likely that the default
swap will be triggered, and the protection buyer actually has to deliver obligations to the
seller. The delivery option will thus be more valuable for low grade issuers.14 Since the
14O’Kane and McAdie (2001) derived a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the value of the delivery
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delivery option is not taken into account in our default swap pricing model in Section 4.2,
the pricing error can be used as a rough estimate of the value of the delivery option.
Hence, if the delivery option is truly an important missing factor, pricing errors should
be positively correlated with hazard rates. If we calculate the correlation of pricing errors
from the linear integrated hazard model with λˆ1, we get values between 35% and 47%,
depending on the proxy for the default-free curve.
6.5 Analyzing Pricing Errors
In the previous section, we showed that the MAPE increases if the credit rating deterio-
rates. It is also interesting to see if differences between market and model premiums can
be related to other characteristics than the issuer’s credit rating. We try to accomplish
this by regressing absolute pricing errors on dummy variables for the following charac-
teristics: deal type (bid or ask), currency (euro or dollar), rating (AAA, AA, A, BBB,
BB), maturity (1-year intervals up to 5 years, and an interval from 5 to 10 years) and
quote date (6-month periods). For each set of dummies, the categories are mutually ex-
clusive, so that an identifying restriction is required. We set a linear combination of the
coefficients to 0, where the weight of a coefficient is equal to the sample mean of the cor-
responding dummy variable.15 The advantage of imposing these restrictions over setting
one coefficient to zero is that the constant of the regression equals the sample mean of
the dependent variable. Furthermore, each coefficient can be interpreted as the change in
the absolute pricing error for that dummy for an otherwise representative observation.
Table 7 shows the regression results for the quadratic specification of the integrated
option: for a default swap written on an issuer with an annual default probability of λ and a potential
gain of G of switching from an expensive to a cheaper deliverable, the value is approximately λG.
15For instance, if β and α denote the coefficients of the bid and ask dummies, we impose bβ+ aα = 0,
where b is the percentage of bid observations and a the percentage of ask observations.
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hazard function for all three proxies for the default-free curve; the results for the linear and
cubic model are similar. We observe that most parameters are statistically different from
zero, the signs of the parameters are largely consistent between the models and the R2
values are between 46% and 58%. Mispricings strongly differ between deal types as errors
on bid quotes are larger than on ask quotes. The maturity of the default swap contract is
also predictive of the pricing error, since the coefficients of the maturity dummies are sig-
nificant (except for the interval from 3 to 4 years) and monotonously increasing. Likewise,
the coefficients of the rating dummies are highly significant and monotonously increas-
ing. The currency dummies are only significant for the government model, indicating
that the swap- and repo-based models price dollar- and euro-denominated default swaps
similarly. Finally, the parameters for the quote date dummies show that for most models
pricing errors in 2000 were smaller than in 1999 or 2001, although not all coefficients are
statistically significant.
7 Summary
In this paper, we empirically investigated the market prices of credit default swaps. We
showed that a simple reduced form model priced credit default swaps better than directly
comparing bonds’ yield spreads to default swap premiums. The model worked reasonably
well for investment grade issuers, but quite poor in the high yield environment; so, there is
definitely room for more empirical research and further model development. Further, we
found evidence that government bonds are no longer considered by the markets to be the
reference default-free instrument. Swap and/or repo rates have taken over this position.
We also showed that bond spreads and default swap premiums are relatively insensitive
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to changes in the assumed constant recovery rate as long as the hazard function is scaled
accordingly.
32
Acknowledgements
This paper is a revised and abridged version of our earlier paper ’An Empirical Compari-
son of Default Swap Pricing Models’. The earlier version was presented at the Tinbergen
Institute 2001 Econometrics Workshop in Rotterdam, the 2002 Meeting of the European
Financial Management Association (EFMA) held in London, the 2002 Meeting of the
European Finance Association (EFA) held in Berlin, the 2nd T.N. Thiele Symposium on
Financial Econometrics in Copenhagen and Forecasting Financial Markets 2003 held in
Paris. The authors thank attendants of these seminars and Kees van den Berg, Mark
Dams, Andrew Gates, Albert Mentink, Zara Pratley, Micha Schipper, Martijn van der
Voort and two anonymous referees for valuable suggestions and critical remarks. The
authors also thank Rabobank International for providing the data. Financial support
by the Erasmus Center for Financial Research (ECFR) is much appreciated. Views ex-
pressed in the paper are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of Rabobank
International, ABN Amro or Robeco Asset Management.
33
References
Aonuma, K. and Nakagawa, H. (1998), Valuation of credit default swap and parameter estima-
tion for Vasicek-type hazard rate model, Working paper, University of Tokyo.
Arnold, S. F. (1990), Mathematical Statistics, Prentice Hall, New Jersey.
Aunon-Nerin, D., Cossin, D., Hricko, T. and Huang, Z. (2002), Exploring for the determinants
of credit risk in credit default swap transaction data: Is fixed-income markets’ information
sufficient to evaluate credit risk?, Working paper, HEC-University of Lausanne and FAME.
url: http://www.hec.unil.ch/dcossin/PAPERS.HTM
Bakshi, G., Madan, D. and Zhang, F. (2001), Understanding the role of recovery in default
risk models: Empirical comparisons and implied recovery rates, Working paper, University of
Maryland.
url: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=285940
BBA (2001), BBA Repo Rates, British Bankers’ Association.
url: http://www.bba.org.uk/
BBA (2002), Credit Derivatives Report 2001/2002, British Bankers’ Association.
url: http://www.bba.org.uk/
Black, F. and Scholes, M. (1973), ‘The pricing of options and corporate liabilities’, Journal of
Political Economy 81, 637–654.
Brooks, R. and Yan, D. Y. (1998), ‘Pricing credit default swaps and the implied default proba-
bility’, Derivatives Quarterly 5(2), 34–41.
Chan, K., Karolyi, G. A., Longstaff, F. A. and Sanders, A. B. (1992), ‘An empirical comparison
of alternative models of the short-term interest rate’, Journal of Finance 47(3), 1209–1227.
Collin-Dufresne, P. and Solnik, B. (2001), ‘On the term structure of default premia in the swap
34
and LIBOR markets’, Journal of Finance 56(3), 1095–1115.
Culp, C. L. and Neves, A. M. P. (1998), ‘Credit and interest rate risk in the business of banking’,
Derivatives Quarterly 4(4), 19–35.
Cumby, R. E. and Evans, M. D. (1997), The term structure of credit risk: Estimates and
specification tests, Working paper, Georgetown University and National Bureau of Economic
Research.
url: http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/evansm1/wpapers.htm
Das, S. R. and Sundaram, R. K. (2000), ‘A discrete-time approach to arbitrage–free pricing of
credit derivatives’, Management Science 46(1), 46–62.
Driessen, J. (2001), The cross-firm behaviour of credit spreads, Working paper, Tilburg Univer-
sity.
url: http://www1.fee.uva.nl/fm/PEOPLE/Driessencv.htm
Duffee, G. R. (1998), ‘The relation between Treasury yields and corporate bond yield spreads’,
Journal of Finance 53(6), 2225–2242.
Duffie, D. (1996), ‘Special repo rates’, Journal of Finance 51(2), 493–526.
Duffie, D. (1999), ‘Credit swap valuation’, Financial Analysts Journal (January–February), 73–
85.
Duffie, D. and Huang, M. (1996), ‘Swap rates and credit quality’, Journal of Finance 51(3), 921–
949.
Duffie, D., Pedersen, L. H. and Singleton, K. J. (2003), ‘Modeling sovereign yield spreads: A
case study of Russian debt’, Journal of Finance 58(1), 119–160.
Duffie, D. and Singleton, K. J. (1997), ‘An econometric model of the term structure of interest-
rate swap yields’, Journal of Finance 52(4), 1287–1321.
35
Duffie, D. and Singleton, K. J. (1999), ‘Modeling term structures of defaultable bonds’, Review
of Financial Studies 12(4), 687–720.
Du¨lmann, K. and Windfuhr, M. (2000), ‘Credit spreads between German and Italian sovereign
bonds: Do one-factor affine models work?’, Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences
17(2).
Fru¨hwirth, M. and So¨gner, L. (2001), The Jarrow/Turnbull default risk model: Evidence from
the German market, Working paper, Vienna University of Economics.
url: http://www.wu-wien.ac.at/usr/abwldcf/mfrueh/publ.html
Fru¨hwirth, M. and So¨gner, L. (2003), The implicit estimation of default intensities and recov-
ery rates, in ‘Proceedings of the 64th Scientific Conference of the Association of University
Professors of Management 2002’, Munich.
Geyer, A., Kossmeier, S. and Pichler, S. (2001), Empirical analysis of European government
yield spreads, Working paper, Vienna University of Economics.
url: http://www.wu-wien.ac.at/usr/or/geyer/publ.htm
Golub, B. and Tilman, L. (2000), ‘No room for nostalgia in fixed income’, Risk (July), 44–48.
Greene, W. H. (2000), Econometric Analysis, 4th edn, Prentice Hall, New Jersey.
Harrison, M. and Pliska, S. (1981), ‘Martingales and stochastic integrals in the theory of con-
tinuous trading’, Stochastic Processes and Their Applications 11, 215–260.
Hjort, V., McLeish, N. A., Dulake, S. and Engineer, M. (2002), The high beta market - Exploring
the default swap basis, Fixed Income Research, MorganStanley, London.
Hull, J. and White, A. (2000), ‘Valuing credit default swaps I: No counterparty default risk’,
The Journal of Derivatives 8(1), 29–40.
Janosi, T., Jarrow, R. and Yildirim, Y. (2002), ‘Estimating expected losses and liquidity dis-
36
counts implicit in debt prices’, The Journal of Risk 5(1).
Jarrow, R. A., Lando, D. and Turnbull, S. M. (1997), ‘A Markov model for the term structure
of credit spreads’, Review of Financial Studies 10(2), 481–523.
Jarrow, R. A. and Turnbull, S. M. (1995), ‘Pricing derivatives with credit risk’, Journal of
Finance 50(1), 53–85.
Jarrow, R. A. and Turnbull, S. M. (1998), Credit risk, in C. Alexander, ed., ‘Handbook of Risk
Management and Analysis’, John Wiley & Sons, pp. 237–254.
Jarrow, R. A. and Turnbull, S. M. (2000), ‘The intersection of market and credit risk’, Journal
of Banking & Finance 24, 271–299.
Keswani, A. (2000), Estimating a risky term structure of Brady bonds, Working paper, Lancaster
University.
url: http://www.lums2.lancs.ac.uk/ACFIN/Papers/2000.HTM
Kocic´, A., Quintos, C. and Yared, F. (2000), Identifying the benchmark security in a multifactor
spread environment, Fixed Income Derivatives Research, Lehman Brothers, New York.
Litterman, R. and Iben, T. (1991), ‘Corporate bond valuation and the term structure of credit
spreads’, Journal of Portfolio Management (Spring), 52–64.
Longstaff, F. A. (2000), ‘The term structure of very short-term rates: New evidence for the
expectations hypothesis’, Journal of Financial Economics 58(3), 397–415.
Longstaff, F. A. and Schwartz, E. S. (1995), ‘Valuing credit derivatives’, Journal of Fixed Income
(June), 6–12.
Madan, D. B. and Unal, H. (1998), ‘Pricing the risks of default’, Review of Derivatives Research
2, 121–160.
Merton, R. C. (1974), ‘On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates’,
37
Journal of Finance 29(2), 449–469.
Nakagawa, H. (1999), Valuation of default swap with affine-type hazard rate, Working paper,
University of Tokyo.
Nielsen, S. S. and Ronn, E. I. (1998), The valuation of default risk in corporate bonds and
interest rate swaps, Working paper, University of Copenhagen and University of Texas at
Austin.
url: http://www.math.ku.dk/∼nielsen/
O’Kane, D. and McAdie, R. (2001), Explaining the basis: Cash versus default swaps, Fixed
Income Research, Lehman Brothers, London.
Patel, N. (2003), ‘Flow business booms’, Risk (February), 20–23.
Perraudin, W. and Taylor, A. (1999), On the consistency of ratings and bond market yields,
Working paper, Bank of England and Birkbeck College.
url: http://wp.econ.bbk.ac.uk/respap/respap frames.html
Scho¨nbucher, P. J. (2000), A LIBOR market model with default risk, Working paper, University
of Bonn.
url: http://www.schonbucher.de/
Scott, L. (1998), A note on the pricing of default swaps, Working paper, Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter.
Taure´n, M. (1999), A comparison of bond pricing models in the pricing of credit risk, Working
paper, Indiana University, Bloomington.
url: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=155688
38
Figure 1:
(a)
(b)
(c)
10
11
12
13
14
15
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
recovery rate
de
fa
u
lt 
sw
ap
 
pr
em
iu
m
 
(bp
s)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
recovery rate
%
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
%
1–recovery rate hazard rate (1–recovery) · hazard
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
4.0%
4.5%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
maturity
ze
ro
-
co
u
po
n
 
ra
te
10%
30%
50%
70%
90%
39
Figure 2:
AAA AA
A BBB
BB B
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
0 10 20 30 40 50
-75
-50
-25
0
25
50
75
100
0 25 50 75 100
-50
-25
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
0 50 100 150 200 250 -100
0
100
200
300
400
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
0 250 500 750 1000
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
40
Figure captions
1 Sensitivity of spreads and default swap premiums to the recovery rate.
A reduced form model with a constant hazard rate is fitted to market
bid quotes of Deutsche Bank bonds on 4 May 1999 for various recovery
rates. The default-free term structure is approximated by the swap curve.
Graph (a) shows the fitted zero-coupon curves; (b) shows 1 minus the
recovery rate and the hazard rate on the left axis, and their product on the
right axis; (c) shows the calculated premiums for a 5 year default swap.
2 Scatter plots of pricing errors versus default swap premiums per rating.
The graphs depict scatter plots of pricing errors (on the vertical axis) versus
default swap premiums (horizontal axis). A pricing error is defined as a
default swap quote minus a bond spread calculated with the interpolation
method and using swap rates as proxy for default-free interest rates
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Table 1: Characteristics of the default swap data set.†
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC NR All
I: Rating
12.0 24.5 43.4 87.9 269.5 483.4 1957.5 55.7 70.6
(1794) (8321) (18613) (13187) (1595) (1118) (10) (2182) (46820 )
II: Rating and deal type
bid 9.8 20.7 38.4 81.5 236.0 431.9 1985.0 55.7 66.4
(882) (3724) (8672) (6484) (868) (592) (5) (880) (22107 )
ask 14.2 27.6 47.8 94.1 309.5 541.3 1930.0 55.8 74.4
(912) (4597) (9941) (6703) (727) (526) (5) (1302) (24713 )
III: Rating and currency
dollar 13.7 25.0 47.1 89.8 269.7 482.1 1957.5 59.9 79.7
(1325) (5193) (14910) (12543) (1589) (1106) (10) (1775) (38451 )
euro 7.5 23.7 28.6 51.7 223.0 598.3 37.5 28.7
(469) (3128) (3703) (644) (6) (12) (407) (8369 )
IV: Rating and maturity
(0,1] 12.1 18.4 31.9 100.8 199.1 407.6 61.9 120.2
(55) (208) (790) (1191) (306) (359) (124) (3033 )
(1,2] 9.4 22.3 30.3 108.1 290.2 432.8 2900.0 52.0 133.5
(24) (80) (721) (788) (295) (183) (4) (71) (2166 )
(2,3] 9.6 26.4 37.2 74.5 242.4 501.0 45.7 75.6
(387) (562) (2142) (1750) (306) (222) (279) (5648 )
(3,4] 11.8 27.3 45.3 87.0 330.9 567.9 1016.7 50.6 65.8
(24) (453) (1242) (686) (32) (47) (3) (335) (2822 )
(4,5] 11.8 24.1 44.6 82.3 281.6 561.2 425.0 60.4 58.4
(675) (6072) (11743) (6710) (555) (230) (1) (1217) (27203 )
(5,-) 14.0 26.3 51.3 103.0 419.0 622.1 2250.0 45.2 75.5
(629) (946) (1975) (2062) (101) (77) (2) (156) (5948 )
V: Rating and date
Q2-1999 13.4 19.7 56.0 103.5 259.6 768.1 98.2 90.7
(265) (839) (2374) (2529) (345) (105) (110) (6567 )
Q3-1999 13.4 24.2 58.8 104.1 300.0 698.4 134.7 106.8
(211) (642) (2106) (2258) (253) (217) (110) (5797 )
Q4-1999 12.2 25.5 42.4 100.1 301.7 545.3 2585.7 46.6 89.4
(77) (622) (1835) (1052) (280) (104) (7) (90) (4067 )
Q1-2000 10.4 23.5 34.9 63.1 172.8 356.3 50.6 58.4
(32) (355) (1367) (953) (118) (99) (185) (3109 )
Q2-2000 11.9 27.8 37.8 73.1 271.5 481.8 47.1 53.7
(109) (837) (2990) (1636) (99) (56) (570) (6297 )
Q3-2000 9.5 25.2 35.9 67.9 299.5 353.8 491.7 46.5 60.0
(393) (2489) (4321) (2893) (304) (415) (3) (618) (11436 )
Q4-2000 11.9 23.6 41.4 93.7 211.9 342.1 53.3 52.8
(619) (2271) (3166) (1566) (186) (118) (464) (8390 )
Q1-2001 17.6 30.6 58.9 114.4 220.5 518.8 61.4 66.7
(88) (266) (454) (300) (10) (4) (35) (1157 )
† The table shows average default swap premiums by rating (Panel I), rating and deal type (II),
rating and currency (III), rating and maturity (IV) and rating and quote date (V). The number
of observations per cell is shown in parentheses.42
Table 2: Performance of the direct comparison methods.†
AAA AA A BBB IGa BB B SGa NR Alla
Matching
Obs.b 1058 2168 1951 1188 6365 441 297 738 40 7144
Swap 5.9 -1.4 -4.9 9.4 0.7 ] 129.7 174.9 148.0 0.2∗ 16.0
(9.1) (14.6) (11.4) (34.3) (16.4 ) (137.0) (187.2) (157.3 ) (27.0) (31.0 )
Repo 1.7 -5.8 -9.7 4.4 -3.8 124.9 170.3 143.3 -5.5∗ 11.4
(8.3) (15.9) (13.5) (34.3) (17.3 ) (133.6) (183.0) (153.5 ) (29.1) (31.5 )
Government -31.1 -32.6 -37.1 -15.8 -30.6 106.6 151.3 124.7 -29.1 -14.5
(31.4) (34.4) (37.8) (41.0) (36.1 ) (118.5) (165.6) (137.5 ) (41.8) (46.7 )
Interpolation
Obs.b 292 1839 2260 1067 5458 316 387 703 61 6222
Swap 0.8∗ -1.6 -3.7 16.6 1.2 154.1 200.5 179.6 -4.3∗ 21.3
(8.2) (11.1) (10.6) (29.5) (14.3 ) (156.0) (201.5) (181.1 ) (28.6) (33.3 )
Repo -3.4 -6.0 -8.7 11.6 -3.5 149.4 196.0 175.1 -9.9] 16.6
(8.2) (12.0) (12.8) (29.2) (15.5 ) (151.8) (197.2) (176.8 ) (32.0) (33.9 )
Government -33.9 -33.4 -31.7 -7.5 -27.6 177.2 133.6 157.6 -32.6 -6.8
(34.3) (34.2) (32.5) (34.8) (33.6 ) (178.7) (137.2) (160.0 ) (49.5) (48.1 )
† The table shows mean pricing errors (MPE) and mean absolute pricing errors (between parentheses) by rating,
pricing method and proxy for the default-free curve. All MPEs are significant at confidence levels above 99%,
except for those marked with ∗ and ], which are insignificant at confidence levels up to 95% and 99%, respectively.
a IG=investment grade subsample; SG=speculative grade subsample; All=entire sample.
b Number of (bond spread, default swap premium) pairs that could be formed.
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Table 3: Paired Z-tests of the direct comparison methods.†
Matching Interpolation
Swap Repo Government Swap Repo Government
Investment grade
Matching
Swap -12.60 -28.08 6.87 4.41 -14.38
Repo -27.41 9.56 7.32 -12.55
Government 29.27 29.28 7.63
Interpolation
Swap -9.54 -24.71
Repo -25.73
Government
Speculative grade
Matching
Swap 14.30 13.89 -4.13 -3.45 -1.46
Repo 12.21 -4.61 -3.93 -1.94
Government -6.36 -5.68 -3.73
Interpolation
Swap 31.28 22.72
Repo 17.26
Government
† The table shows t-values of paired Z-tests for all combinations of pricing methods
and proxies for the default-free curve.
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Table 4: Estimates of the reduced form credit risk models.†
AAA AA A BBB BB B NR All
Observationsa 933 955 166 182 146 255 3 2639
Swap
1 RMSE 0.17 0.22 0.39 0.74 2.15 1.95 0.53 0.88
λ1 0.07 0.36 0.72 1.42 7.18 6.65 1.95 2.62
2 RMSE 0.15 0.17 0.26 0.54 1.26 1.21 0.30 0.55
λ1 0.10 0.27 0.46 1.05 4.83 4.52 0.43 1.66
λ2 -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.38 0.39 0.43 0.18
3 RMSE 0.15 0.15 0.23 0.46 1.13 0.97 0.15 0.46
λ1 0.10 0.27 0.42 1.16 5.46 2.98 -2.77 1.09
λ2 -0.02 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.18 1.02 2.47 0.53
λ3 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.31 -0.05
Repo
1 RMSE 0.17 0.22 0.39 0.74 2.14 1.95 0.54 0.88
λ1 0.15 0.45 0.83 1.52 7.28 6.75 2.05 2.72
2 RMSE 0.15 0.17 0.27 0.54 1.26 1.20 0.30 0.55
λ1 0.18 0.36 0.55 1.14 4.93 4.61 0.53 1.76
λ2 -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.38 0.39 0.43 0.19
3 RMSE 0.15 0.15 0.23 0.46 1.13 0.96 0.16 0.46
λ1 0.18 0.36 0.52 1.23 5.55 3.08 -2.69 1.17
λ2 -0.02 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.18 1.02 2.48 0.53
λ3 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.31 -0.05
Government
1 RMSE 0.37 0.38 0.51 0.87 2.29 2.10 0.61 1.02
λ1 0.75 1.04 1.36 1.98 7.66 7.23 2.59 3.23
2 RMSE 0.18 0.17 0.27 0.55 1.25 1.21 0.31 0.56
λ1 0.39 0.50 0.71 1.32 5.06 4.78 0.73 1.92
λ2 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.43 0.45 0.53 0.25
3 RMSE 0.16 0.15 0.24 0.46 1.12 0.95 0.17 0.46
λ1 0.26 0.45 0.61 1.29 5.61 3.15 -2.53 1.26
λ2 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.10 0.24 1.11 2.61 0.64
λ3 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.06 -0.31 -0.05
† The table shows the average fit measured by the root mean squared error (RMSE)
of the bond residuals and (100 times) the average parameter estimates λi, i = 1, 2, 3
(λ0 is restricted to zero) per rating and model. Each model is characterized by the
proxy for the default-free curve and the degree of the integrated hazard function.
a Number of issuer-days on which we have at least one default swap quote and at least
five bond quotes.
45
Table 5: Performance of the reduced form credit risk models.†
AAA AA A BBB IGa BB B SGa NR Alla
Swap
1 1.8 0.6] -0.4∗ -3.6] -0.4 ∗ 60.3 88.0 76.3 12.5 14.3
(4.5) (8.2) (11.7) (24.7) (12.0 ) (110.8) (152.4) (134.8 ) (12.5) (35.6 )
2 3.0 2.5 2.1 5.1 2.8 123.4 145.9 136.3 74.4 30.2
(4.1) (6.9) (10.0) (19.3) (10.1 ) (130.5) (159.5) (147.2 ) (74.4) (38.2 )
3 3.7 4.0 2.8 7.4 4.3 114.0 168.7 145.3 36.6
(4.9) (7.9) (9.3) (20.6) (10.8 ) (137.2) (170.7) (156.3 ) (44.2 )
Repo
1 -2.0 -3.1 -4.7 -8.5 -4.5 55.6 83.7 71.8 7.4 9.7
(4.7) (9.6) (11.8) (24.8) (12.6 ) (109.7) (151.1) (133.6 ) (8.2) (35.1 )
2 -0.3∗ -1.4 -2.3 0.3∗ -1.4 118.7 141.6 131.9 69.3 24.9
(3.7) (7.8) (10.4) (18.8) (10.4 ) (126.7) (156.4) (143.8 ) (69.3) (36.7 )
3 0.4∗ 0.0∗ -1.4 2.6] 0.0 ∗ 109.4 164.5 140.9 30.3
(3.9) (8.1) (9.4) (19.6) (10.4 ) (134.0) (166.8) (152.7 ) (41.1 )
Government
1 -33.4 -36.6 -35.7 -29.9 -34.8 34.6 56.8 47.4 -18.6 -19.5
(33.5) (36.7) (36.3) (36.0) (36.1 ) (103.6) (149.6) (130.2 ) (18.6) (53.7 )
2 -25.3 -28.7 -25.3 -17.5 -25.4 104.8 123.8 115.8 55.1 0.5 ∗
(25.3) (28.8) (27.0) (24.7) (27.2 ) (114.8) (144.5) (131.9 ) (55.1) (46.4 )
3 -25.9 -28.4 -22.9 -13.0 -23.5 96.6 148.1 126.1 6.4
(25.9) (28.5) (25.0) (22.3) (26.0 ) (123.0) (151.0) (139.0 ) (48.6 )
† The table shows mean pricing errors (MPE) and mean absolute pricing errors (between parentheses)
by rating and model. Each model is characterized by the proxy for the default-free curve and the
degree of the integrated hazard function. All MPEs are significant at confidence levels above 99%,
except for those marked with ∗ and ], which are insignificant at confidence levels up to 95% and 99%,
respectively.
a IG=investment grade; SG=speculative grade; All=entire sample.
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Table 6: Paired Z-tests of the reduced form credit risk models.†
Swap Repo Government
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Investment grade
Swap
1 4.50 0.70 -7.87 1.85 0.19 -30.40 -22.44 -18.78
2 -2.79 -7.11 -4.71 -3.48 -27.47 -24.04 -21.57
3 -3.06 0.43 -1.30 -24.48 -18.50 -22.26
Repo
1 5.95 2.80 -29.94 -20.57 -16.82
2 -1.28 -27.42 -25.22 -21.63
3 -24.27 -19.14 -23.73
Government
1 16.39 14.06
2 1.07
3
Speculative grade
Swap
1 -1.43 -4.02 1.06 -0.29 -3.03 -0.87 3.03 -0.18
2 -5.04 1.44 19.22 -3.28 0.71 15.54 1.51
3 3.97 6.61 23.75 2.96 10.23 22.14
Repo
1 -0.37 -3.01 -1.27 2.71 -0.27
2 -4.88 -0.13 12.82 0.01
3 2.15 8.61 17.54
Government
1 2.49 0.14
2 -3.87
3
† The table shows t-values of paired Z-tests for all combinations of models and proxies
for the default-free curve.
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Table 7: Analysis of absolute pricing errors from a reduced form
model with a quadratic integrated hazard function.†
Swap Repo Government
R2 58% 57% 46%
constant 38.2 (52.6) 36.7 (52.9) 46.4 (72.3)
Deal type
bid 5.4 (8.4) 5.7 (8.9) 5.6 (9.2)
ask -7.0 (8.4) -6.9 (8.9) -6.4 (9.2)
Maturity
(0,1] -48.1 (26.6) -45.2 (24.5) -37.7 (18.2)
(1,2] -26.6 (8.3) -24.5 (7.8) -18.2 (6.1)
(2,3] -8.7 (4.1) -7.9 (3.9) -7.5 (4.0)
(3,4] -2.7 (0.8) -2.1 (0.7) -1.4 (0.5)
(4,5] 7.7 (9.6) 7.0 (9.2) 5.8 (8.7)
(5,-) 19.7 (6.7) 16.9 (6.1) 7.8 (3.3)
Rating
AAA -36.8 (10.5) -33.9 (11.0) -25.7 (10.7)
AA -36.5 (26.5) -33.0 (25.6) -23.3 (20.4)
A -30.6 (27.5) -28.5 (26.9) -21.1 (21.0)
BBB -22.2 (11.0) -21.4 (11.0) -19.8 (10.7)
BB 102.6 (38.9) 98.9 (38.4) 79.2 (31.9)
B 138.3 (60.3) 135.1 (60.3) 113.2 (52.3)
Currency
dollar -0.9 (1.3) -0.6 (0.9) -3.2 (4.7)
euro 2.1 (1.3) 1.3 (0.9) 6.0 (4.7)
Date
Q2 1999 6.0 (2.7) 6.1 (2.8) -1.0 (0.5)
Q3,Q4 1999 0.4 (0.2) 1.0 (0.4) 7.0 (2.7)
Q1,Q2 2000 -6.4 (2.4) -6.5 (2.6) -4.9 (2.0)
Q3,Q4 2000 -4.3 (1.7) -5.1 (2.1) -3.3 (1.4)
Q1,Q2 2001 11.1 (1.9) 8.2 (1.5) -0.9 (0.2)
† The table shows estimated coefficients and t-values (between parenthe-
ses) of regressions of absolute pricing errors on dummy variables for deal
type (bid or ask), currency (euro or dollar), rating (AAA, AA, A, BBB
or BB), maturity (1-year intervals up to 5 years, and an interval from 5
to 10 years) and quote date (6-month periods). For each set of dummies,
we set the weighted average of the coefficients to 0, where the weight
of a coefficient equals the sample mean of the corresponding dummy
variable.
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